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Abstract: 
This paper puts three of the most prominent specifications of ‘other-regarding’ preferences to 
the experimental test, namely the theories developed by Charness and Rabin, by Fehr and 
Schmidt, and by Andreoni and Miller. In a series of experiments based on various dictator and 
prisoner’s dilemma games, we try to uncover which of these concepts, or the classical selfish 
approach, is able to explain most of our experimental findings. The experiments are special 
with regard to two aspects: First, we investigate the consistency of individual behavior within 
and across different classes of games. Second, we analyze the stability of individual behavior 
over time by running the same experiments on the same subjects at several points in time. 
Our results demonstrate that in the first wave of experiments, all theories of other-regarding 
preferences explain a high share of individual decisions. Other-regarding preferences seem to 
wash out over time, however. In the final wave, it is the classical theory of selfish behavior 
that delivers the best explanation. Stable behavior over time is observed only for subjects, 
who behave strictly selfish. Most subjects behave consistently with regard to at least one of 
the theories within the same class of games, but are much less consistent across games. 
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1 Introduction 
For a long time, economic science was built on a specification of individual preferences that 
implies rational and purely self-interested behavior. Over the last two decades, experimental 
research has produced a number of stylized facts that cast some doubt on the empirical valid-
ity of this specification, however. Subjects make voluntary contributions in public good 
games (see, e.g., Kim and Walker, 1984, Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985), they cooperate in 
the prisoner’s dilemma (see, e.g., Flood, 1952, 1958), and they make significant donations to 
others in dictator games (see, e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986, Forsythe, Horo-
witz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994). None of these findings can be fully accounted for by the stan-
dard approach of rational and selfish behavior.  
One way to tackle this problem is to deviate from the assumption of pure self-interest, while 
maintaining the rational choice approach. This path has been followed by a number of theo-
rists, who integrate some kind of other-regarding behavior into the individual preference 
model in order to organize the experimental data. For example, the theories developed by Bol-
ton and Ockenfels (2000) and by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are based on the supposition that 
people are not only interested in their own absolute payoff, but also in their own relative pay-
off. Charness and Rabin (2003) propose a theory of social preferences assuming that subjects 
care about their own payoff, the others’ payoff, and about efficiency. Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) and Andreoni, Castillo, and Petrie (2005) model a concern for altruism and efficiency 
by defining utility functions over giving to self and to others.1 
All of these theories assume that individual preferences do not vary across games and over 
time. Given this assumption it should be possible to rationalize individual behavior observed 
in various experiments as the result of a particular preference model. In this paper we report 
the findings of a project in which we directly test this implication. First, we confront subjects 
in a within-subject design with different variants of modified dictator games and the pris-
oner’s dilemma game in order to check whether they behave consistently within and across 
different classes of games.2 Second, we repeat this experiment three times with the same sub-
                                                 
1 Alternative approaches assume some kind of reciprocity caused by the harming or helping intentions by the 
fellow players (see, e.g., Geanakoplos, Pearse, and Stacchetti, 1989, Rabin, 1993, Levine, 1998, Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 1998, Falk and Fischbacher, 1998). 
2 Within and across game consistency was also investigated by Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2006). In 
contrast to our paper, they solely focus on the theory proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and do not aim to 
analyze the stability of individual preferences over time (see also our discussion in section 6). Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2006) use a within-subject design to analyze individual preferences in two subsequently played public 
good games.  
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jects within three months. This allows us to investigate whether subjects’ behavior is stable 
over time.  
Section 2 of our paper describes the modified dictator games and prisoner’s dilemma games 
in more detail. In section 3 we present the notions of consistency, which were tested in the 
experiments. The notions are based on the standard approach of purely self-interested behav-
ior and on three of the most prominent specifications of other-regarding preferences, namely 
the theories developed by Charness and Rabin, by Fehr and Schmidt, and by Andreoni and 
Miller (which allow to make specific predictions in our games). The experimental design is 
included in section 4 and the findings are discussed in section 5. Section 6 summarizes our 
results and concludes. 
Our observations cast some doubt on the assumption of stable and consistent behavior. In 
particular, we could not find any other-regarding behavior, which is stable over time. While, 
in the first wave, there are many subjects, who show some kind of concern for others, this 
behavior changes over time into more selfishness. Stable behavior is displayed only by those, 
who behave strictly selfish. This gives rise to some fundamental questions. Given that other-
regarding behavior disappears as soon as subjects become familiar with the experimental 
situation or the behavioral problem in focus, it must be asked how many of the “anomalies” 
observed in experiments are produced as artifacts of the laboratory situation.  
2 Games 
In order to investigate individual preferences, we employ two types of games, modified dicta-
tor games and prisoner’s dilemma (PD) games. The games are described in detail below. 
2.1 Modified dictator games 
Our dictator games differ from standard dictator games in an important aspect: Dictators do 
not distribute a fixed amount of money between themselves and the recipients, but the amount 
to be distributed varies systematically. In each game, the dictator has to choose between 
eleven different distributions of payoffs to himself, πA, and to the recipient, πB. There are two 
different types of dictator games used in the experiment, ’take’ games and ’give’ games. 
Take games 
In each of the four take games, starting from the equal distribution (500, 500), player A (the 
dictator) can reduce player B’s (the recipient) payoff by ΔπB in order to increase the own pay-
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off by ΔπA at a constant relative price m = |ΔπA / ΔπB|, such that πA = 500 + m (500 − πB). The 
four games only differ with respect to the size of m: In the first game, T1, we have m = mT1 = 
2, in remaining games the m-values are mT2 = 3/2, mT3 = 1, and mT4 = 1/2, respectively. Ex-
cept for the equal payoff distribution, all possible options in the take games are chosen in a 
way, that they assure a higher payoff to player A than to player B, πA > πB. The experimental 
set-up for the four games is illustrated in Table 1. 
Game π 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
T1 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
600, 
450 
700, 
400 
800, 
350 
900, 
300 
1000, 
250 
1100, 
200 
1200, 
150 
1300, 
100 
1400, 
50 
1500, 
0 
T2 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
575, 
450 
650, 
400 
725, 
350 
800, 
300 
875, 
250 
950, 
200 
1025, 
150 
1100, 
100 
1175, 
50 
1250, 
0 
T3 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
550, 
450 
600, 
400 
650, 
350 
700, 
300 
750, 
250 
800, 
200 
850, 
150 
900, 
100 
950, 
50 
1000, 
0 
T4 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
525, 
450 
550, 
400 
575, 
350 
600, 
300 
625, 
250 
650, 
200 
675, 
150 
700, 
100 
725, 
50 
750, 
0 
Table 1: Payoffs in the four take games. 
Give games 
In each of the four give games, starting from the equal distribution (500, 500), player A (the 
dictator) can increase player B’s (the recipient) payoff by ΔπB at a personal cost of ΔπA at a 
constant relative price m = |ΔπA / ΔπB|, such that πA = 500 + m (500 − πB). The four games 
only differ with respect to the size of m: In the first game, G1, we have m = mG1 = 1/2, in the 
remaining games the m-values are mG2 = 2/3, mG3 = 1, and mG4 = 2, respectively. Choices in 
the give games (except for the equal payoff distribution) grant a higher payoff to player B 
than to player A, πA < πB. The experimental set-up is illustrated in Table 2. 
Game π 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
G1 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
450, 
600 
400, 
700 
350, 
800 
300, 
900 
250, 
1000 
200, 
1100 
150, 
1200 
100, 
1300 
50, 
1400 
0, 
1500 
G2 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
450, 
575 
400, 
650 
350, 
725 
300, 
800 
250, 
875 
200, 
950 
150, 
1025 
100, 
1100 
50, 
1175 
0, 
1250 
G3 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
450, 
550 
400, 
600 
350, 
650 
300, 
700 
250, 
750 
200, 
800 
150, 
850 
100, 
900 
50, 
950 
0, 
1000 
G4 
πA 
πB 
500, 
500 
450, 
525 
400, 
550 
350, 
575 
300, 
600 
250, 
625 
200, 
650 
150, 
675 
100, 
700 
50, 
725 
0, 
750 
Table 2: Payoffs in the four give games. 
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2.1 Sequential prisoner’s dilemma games 
The payoffs in the two sequential prisoner’s dilemma games are given in Figure 1. In both 
games, the decisions of player A (the second mover) are elicited using the strategy method, 
i.e. player A has to respond to each of the two actions feasible for player B (the first mover). 
Player B 
 
                                                          C                             D 
 
Player A                                                                   Player A 
 
                      c                     d                                                  c                      d 
 
            500, 500             100, 700       Prisoner’s dilemma I      700, 100                200, 200 
 
            500, 500             100, 900       Prisoner’s dilemma II     900, 100                200, 200 
Figure 1: Payoffs in the two prisoner’s dilemma games. 
3 Concepts of consistency 
In our study, we investigate consistency with regard to the decisions made by players A. The 
concepts are based on three notions of preferences, selfish preferences (‘S-consistency’), An-
dreoni/Miller preferences (‘AM-consistency’), and Fehr/Schmidt and Charness/Rabin prefer-
ences (‘FS/CR-consistency’). 
3.1 Consistency according to selfish preferences 
A player A with selfish preferences does solely care for his own payoff πA. Assuming that 
player A derives positive utility from πA, i.e. 
( ) ( ) ,0      with  >∂
⋅∂=
A
A
S
A
uuU ππ  
then a selfish individual will always maximize his own payoff. The implications for the defi-
nition of consistency in our games are straightforward. An S-consistent player A will always 
take the maximum possible amount from player B in the take games (i.e., will always choose 
option 11), will always transfer the minimum possible amount to player B in the give games 
(i.e., will always choose option 1), and will always choose d in PD games. 
All types of other-regarding preferences analyzed in this paper will include selfish preferences 
as a special case. 
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3.2 Consistency according to Andreoni/Miller preferences 
Our second concept of consistency is in the spirit of the one introduced by Andreoni and 
Miller (2002). According to this concept, own and other’s payoff are considered as ‘normal 
goods’. Assuming that player A derives non-negative utility from her own payoff and from 
player B’s payoff and ruling out the case of simultaneous indifference with regard to both, the 
utility function can be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 0     and    0 ,0      with  , ≠∂
⋅∂+∂
⋅∂≥∂
⋅∂≥∂
⋅∂=
BABA
BA
AM
A
uuuuuU ππππππ  
Dictator games 
Since πA and πB are normal goods, optimum demand for πB, *Bπ , should not increase in the 
relative price m, i.e. .0 * ≤∂∂ mBπ  Consequently, in the take games, the amount taken from 
player B, τ = 500 – *Bπ , should not fall in m, i.e. ( ) .0500 * ≥∂−∂ mBπ  Given that in the four 
take games mT1 > mT2 > mT3 > mT4, our definition of consistency in these games is: 
AM-CONSISTENCY IN TAKE GAMES: An AM-consistent player A in a take game will take no 
more from player B the lower the relative price m of his own payoff is, i.e. 
τ T1 ≥ τ T2 ≥τ T3 ≥ τ T4. 
Accordingly, in the give games , the amount given to player B, γ = *Bπ  − 500, should not rise 
in m, i.e. ( ) .0500 * ≤∂−∂ mBπ  Given that in the four give games mG1 < mG2 < mG3 < mG4, our 
definition of consistency in the give games is: 
AM-CONSISTENCY IN GIVE GAMES: An AM-consistent player A in a give game will transfer no 
less to player B the lower the relative price m of his own payoff is, i.e. 
γ G1 ≥ γ G2 ≥ γ G3 ≥ γ G4. 
PD games 
For players A with Andreoni/Miller preferences, the definition of consistency in the pris-
oner’s dilemma games is straightforward: 
AM-CONSISTENCY IN PD GAMES: For an AM-consistent player A in both PD games, who is 
following a C choice of player B, the following should hold: 
1. A player A choosing d over c in PD I, should choose d over c in PD II. 
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2. A player A choosing c over d in PD II,  should choose c over d in PD I. 
For an AM-consistent player A in both PD games, who is following a D choice of player 
B, the following should hold: 
1. A player A choosing c over d in PD I, should choose c over d in PD II. 
2. A player A choosing d over c in PD II, should choose d over c in PD I. 
3.3 Consistency according to Fehr/Schmidt and Charness/Rabin preferences 
Another way of modeling other-regarding preferences takes into account notions of inequality 
aversion. Preferences of this type have been introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Char-
ness and Rabin (2002) also consider inequality aversion, but additionally include reciprocity 
concerns in their preference model. In our experimental set-up, both models have the same 
implications for the consistency of subjects’ behavior.3  
As long as player B has not ‘misbehaved’ according to Charness and Rabin, reciprocity does 
not matter and the two approaches can be represented by using the Fehr/Schmidt utility func-
tion4 
( ) ( )( )  for      
for      
,
A
A
⎩⎨
⎧
<−−
≥−−==
BAAB
BABA
BAA uU ππππαπ
ππππβπππ , 
where it is assumed that α ≥ β and 0 ≤ β < 1. In case of ‘misbehavior’, the Charness/Rabin 
utility function changes to: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧
<−+−−
≥−+−−==
BAABAB
BABABA
BAA uU ππππψππαπ
ππππψππβπππ
for      
for      
,
A
A , 
where it is additionally assumed that ψ > 0. With preferences including inequity aversion, a 
player gains utility from his own payoff and loses utility from a difference between his own 
and the other’s payoff. Considering reciprocity in the case of ‘misbehavior’, the utility loss 
from a difference between the own and the other’s payoff is even larger.  
 
 
                                                 
3 Note that qualitatively similar results can be obtained when applying the relative-payoff approach by Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000). The precise definitions of consistency resulting from this approach depend on the specific 
parameterization of their ’motivation function’, however. 
4 For details refer to Appendix A. 
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Dictator games 
In specifications of other–regarding preference incorporating notions of inequity–aversion, 
payoffs to others do not generally increase every players’ utility. If player A has a lower pay-
off than player B (πA ≤ πB), which is the case in our give games, FS/CR-consistency coincides 
with S-consistency. A decrease in πA has a two-fold negative effect on player A’s utility. On 
the one hand, utility falls because of the direct effect of the decrease in πA. On the other hand, 
utility falls because a decrease in πA will increase inequality πB – πA. Consequently, in the 
give games, an FS/CR-consistent player A should keep everything to himself: 
FS/CR-CONSISTENCY IN GIVE GAMES: An FS/CR-consistent player A in a give game will trans-
fer no money to player B, i.e. γ G1 = γ G2 = γ G3 = γ G4 = 0. 
Things are slightly more complicated if player A has a higher payoff than player B (πA ≥ πB) 
as it is the case in our take games. Changes in πA will have two opposite effects: On the one 
hand, a rise in πA increases utility. On the other hand, this also increases the inequality be-
tween πA and πB, which, in turn, decreases utility. This tradeoff needs to be examined in 
greater detail. Each of our take games can be characterized by a parameter βc, which is the 
value of β that leaves an individual indifferent between all choices available in that take 
game. A player i with a degree of difference aversion higher than βc, βi > βc, suffers compara-
bly strong from the difference in payoffs and will thus aim to keep the difference as low as 
possible, i.e. takes nothing from B. A player i with βi < βc will aim to enlarge the difference, 
i.e. takes everything from B. It can be found that in our take games, the relative price of πA, m, 
and the critical value βc are alternative measures. One can be computed from the other as βc = 
m/(m+1). 
In the take games, we have βcT1 = 2/3, βcT2 = 3/5, βcT3 = 1/2, and βcT4 = 1/3. Consequently, 
only a player A with a low βi will take anything from player B. As an example, take a player i 
with βcT3 > βi > βcT4. This player will take nothing in game T4, but will take everything in 
games T1 to T3, i.e. τ T1 = τ T2 =τ T3 ≥ τ T4 = 0. Extending this exemplary notion to every pos-
sible value of βi, we define FS/CR-consistency in the take games as follows: 
FS/CR-CONSISTENCY IN TAKE GAMES: An FS/CR-consistent player A in a take game will take 
no more from player B the lower the relative price m of his own payoff is, i.e. 
τ T1 ≥ τ T2 ≥τ T3 ≥ τ T4. 
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PD games 
Since sequential prisoner’s dilemma games represent strategic interactions, reciprocity might 
play a role. According to Charness and Rabin reciprocity only matters, however, if player B 
‘misbehaves’. Consequently, we have to condition the definitions of consistency on the ac-
tions chosen by player B. If player B chooses C, i.e. if he does not ‘misbehave’, the defini-
tions of FS-consistency and CR-consistency coincide. If player B chooses D, i.e. if he ‘misbe-
haves’, the reciprocity term of the Charness/Rabin utility function matter.  
Following a D–move by player B, a player A can achieve both, a higher πA and a lower dif-
ference between πA and πB by choosing D. This increases utility when applying the Fehr/ 
Schmidt utility function and, because of the reciprocity term, does even more so when apply-
ing the Charness/Rabin utility function. Thus, in the case of a D-move, both approaches lead 
to the same definition of consistency. 
FS/CR-CONSISTENCY IN PD GAMES FOLLOWING A D-MOVE: An FS/CR-consistent player A in 
both PD games, who is following a D choice of player B, will choose d. 
If player B chooses C, things are slightly more complicated. Again, each subgame following a 
C-move can be characterized by a critical value of βc, which leaves player i with βi = βc indif-
ferent between choosing c and d. The critical values for the two PD games are βcPDI = 1/3 and 
βcPDII = 1/2. Players A with a relatively low βi will opt for the more unequal payoff distribu-
tion, i.e. will choose d, and players A with a relatively high βi will opt for the more equal 
payoff distribution, i.e. will choose c. 
FS/CR-CONSISTENCY IN PD I GAMES FOLLOWING A C-MOVE: An FS/CR-consistent player A in  
PD I games, who is following a C choice of player B, will choose d, if βi < 1/3, and will 
choose c, if βi > 1/3. Otherwise she will be indifferent. 
FS/CR-CONSISTENCY IN PD II GAMES FOLLOWING A C-MOVE: An FS/CR-consistent player A 
in PD II games, who is following a C choice of player B, will choose d, if βi < 1/2, and 
will choose c, if βi > 1/2. Otherwise she will be indifferent. 
Our definitions of consistency obtained by applying selfish preferences, Andreoni/Miller pref-
erences and Fehr/Schmidt and Charness/Rabin preferences are summarized in Table 3. 
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 Give games Take games PD I PD II 
always d/D S- 
consistency 
γ G1 = γ G2 = γ G3 = γ G4 
= 0 
τ T1 = τ T2 =τ T3 = τ T4 
= 500 always d/C 
c/D in PD I  ⇒  c/D in PD II, 
d/D  in PD II  ⇒  d/D in PD I AM- 
consistency γ G1 ≥ γ G2 ≥ γ G3 ≥ γ G4 τ T1 ≥ τ T2 ≥τ T3 ≥ τ T4 c/C in PD II ⇒  c/C in PD I, 
d/C  in PD I  ⇒  d/C in PD II 
always d/D 
FS/CR-
consistency 
γ G1 = γ G2 = γ G3 = γ G4 
= 0 τ T1 ≥ τ T2 ≥τ T3 ≥ τ T4 
d/C if βi < 1/3, 
c/C, if βi > 1/3, 
indifference 
otherwise 
d/C if βi < 1/2, 
c/C, if βi > 1/2, 
indifference 
otherwise 
 
Table 3: Definitions of consistency. 
3.4 Consistency across games 
S-consistency (AM-consistency) in each of the 10 games implies S-consistency (AM-
consistency) across games. A more complex definition of consistency across games can be 
obtained when applying Fehr/Schmidt and Charness/Rabin preferences. Given that players are 
FS/CR-consistent in each of the four give games and in each of the two PD games after a D-
move and given their specific βi obtained in the take games, consistency across games re-
quires the following PD choices after a C-move: 
τ = 0 in Choice in PD I (βcPDI = 1/3) Choice in PD II (βcPDII = 1/2) 
T1 c c 
T2 c c 
T3 c indifference 
T4 indifference ? 
 
Table 4: Consistent PD choices after a C-move by player B. 
Thus, across games, things depend on βis, which are ‘revealed’ in the take games. For exam-
ple, a player A consistently choosing to take nothing in T1 reveals to have a βi > βcT1 = 2/3. A 
player A with βi > 2/3 should choose c in both PD games following a C-move by player B. 
For a player A taking nothing in T2, we know that βi > 3/5, which implies that he should 
choose c after a C–move of player B in both PD–games. 
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4 Experimental design 
The ten games were played over two sessions, which were conducted within one week in 
April 2006. Each of the two sessions was run with four groups of subjects consisting of 10 
players A and 10 players B. In session 1 subjects participated in the four take games and in 
prisoner’s dilemma I. In session 2 subjects participated in the four give games and in pris-
oner’s dilemma II. The sequence of play is illustrated in Table 5. The two sessions were re-
peated twice, once in June 2006 (wave 2) and once in July 2006 (wave 3). In order to investi-
gate the stability and consistency of preferences, the 2 x 3 sessions were conducted using a 
within-subject design for players A. Players B were newly recruited for each session and 
players A were informed about this.  
 1st game 2nd game 3rd game 4th game 5th game 
Session 1 T2 T4 PD I T1 T3 
Session 2 G3 G1 PD II G4 G2 
 
Table 5: Sequence of play. 
At the beginning of each session in waves 1 and 2, subjects were told that they have to make 
decisions, but were left ignorant about the structure and number of games to be played. Wave 
3 differed from the previous two waves in that subjects were informed about the five games 
right at the beginning of each session.5 In all sessions, we employed a perfect random match-
ing design, i.e. players A were matched with different players B, and subjects were informed 
accordingly. In addition, subjects were told that they will receive no feedback about their part-
ner’s and others’ decisions during the experiment. At the end of each sessions subjects were 
paid off their total profit made in the five games at an exchange rate of 150 Lab-Cents = 100 
Eurocents. The payment was conducted anonymously employing a double-blind procedure. 
The computerized experiment was run with a total of 2706 students at the Magdeburg Labora-
tory for Experimental Economics (MaXLab) using Fischbacher’s (1999) z-tree software tool. 
Average payoffs were about €15.03, with a minimum of €0.67 and a maximum of €34.67. No 
experiment lasted longer than 30 minutes.  
                                                 
5 This was done in order to amplify subjects' experience in a way that mimics the influence of repetitions of the 
experiment. Possible effects on subjects’ behavior are discussed in section 5.1. 
6 In wave 1, there were 40 (40) players A (B) in both sessions. Due to no-shows, in wave 2 there were 39 (39) 
players A (B) in both sessions, and in wave 3 there were 37 (37) players A (B) in session 1 and 35 (35) players A 
(B) in session 2. 
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5 Results 
In order to report on our large set of data (decisions made by players A in three different 
classes of games – take games, give games, and PD games – which are played in different 
variants in three waves over time), the results section is structured in the following way. We 
first look at the aggregate data level, which is the focus of most experimental studies. After 
that, we take a closer inspection of individual behavior. This essentially means two things: 
First, we analyze the consistency of individual behavior, trying to find out to what extend the 
concepts of consistency introduced earlier in this paper can account for individual’s behavior 
observed within and across the three classes of games in each of the three waves. Second, we 
investigate each individual’s stability of behavior, describing whether, and if so, how, indi-
vidual behavior changes over time. 
Looking at aggregate behavior, we find that, in the first wave, the three models assuming 
some form of other-regarding behavior outperform the standard theory of pure-self-interest. 
Similar is true for individual behavior. There are more subjects, who behave consistently 
other-regarding (particularly AM-consistent), than subjects, who behave consistently selfish 
within and across the different classes of games. Over time, the frequency of consistent be-
havior increases. The proportion of consistent purely other-regarding behavior declines from 
wave to wave, however, while the proportion of consistent self-interested behavior increases. 
In the third wave nearly all consistent decisions can be rationalized by pure self-interest. This 
last observation also dominates our findings concerning the stability of behavior. Only a few 
subjects behave stable over time, all of them making selfish decisions. The following subsec-
tions present our findings in more detail. 
5.1 Aggregate behavior 
In order to get a first impression of what happens in the course of the experiments, we look at 
the aggregate data obtained for each class of games in each of the three waves.7  
                                                 
7 Analyzing wave 3, we have to take into account that the experimental design slightly changed from wave 2 to 
wave 3. In the last wave subjects were informed about the sequence of games, while in the first two waves they 
were not. Changing the informational design in this direction, we believe we can generate a ‘time-lapse’ effect, 
mimicking the experience-enhancing effect of repeating the experiment. Potentially this change is in favor of 
non-selfish behavior. Given a subject plans to ‘give’ some money to one of his opponents, he can choose the one 
single game within the experiment that suits him most to do this (maybe because giving to others is particularly 
‘cheap’ in that game, maybe because the game allows the subjects to give away a certain amount of money, or 
because of other reasons). Calculating the total amount of money players A allocate to themselves or the total 
amount of money players A allocate to their opponents for all three waves separately, we do not observe such an 
increase of other-regarding behavior, however (see Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B). 
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In the take games of the first wave we observe that the average amounts taken away from 
players B are lower than 500. Moreover, the average taken amount, if at all, significantly de-
creases with a lower relative price for player’s A payoff (significance levels for all game 
comparisons are displayed in Table 6). That is, on the aggregate level the observed behavior 
is in line with all three theories of other-regarding behavior (FS, CR, and AM).  
 T1 vs. T2 T1 vs. T3 T1 vs. T4 T2 vs. T3 T2 vs. T4 T3 vs. T4 
Wave 1 p = 0.288 p =0.132 p =0.071 p =0.036 p = 0.023 p =0.266 
Wave 2 0.438 0.367 0.008 0.041 0.000 0.039 
Table 6: Significance levels for take games (two-tailed exact Wilcoxon test). 
Similar is true for the second wave, though the average amounts taken away by players A are 
significantly higher than in wave 1 (p < 0.003, two-tailed exact Wilcoxon test). In the third 
wave, players A take almost all money from players B in all four games. There are no longer 
any significant differences regarding player As’ behavior between four games. These observa-
tions indicate that selfish behavior, which is not dominant in wave 1, takes over by the last 
wave and already plays a major role in wave 2. The aggregate results from the dictator games 
are displayed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Average amount taken/given in the take games/give games in the three waves. 
In the give games, things are quite different. On average, players A do not give significant 
amounts in all three waves. There are neither significant differences between games nor be-
tween waves. The fact that giving creates an efficiency gain does not seem to be a driving 
force for average decisions. The aggregate data obtained in giving games can be fully ac-
counted for by the standard model of purely selfish behavior (though, it is not in contrast to 
the predictions made by the other three models).  
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Figure 3: Average frequency of d-moves in the two PD-games in the three waves. 
Comparing the average frequencies of d-moves between PD I and PD II, we find no signifi-
cant differences within any one wave (see Figure 3). Similarly, there are no significant differ-
ences between players As’ average response to a C-move and their average response to a D-
move in either of the two games and the three waves, respectively.8 That is, the average player 
A does not condition his move on the behavior of his opponent. These findings are in line 
with the models by Fehr and Schmidt, Charness and Rabin, and Andreoni and Miller. 
The average frequency of purely self-interested behavior is always higher than 60 percent in 
wave 1, and increases in nearly all repetitions (except for PD II where we observe a weakly 
significant decrease of d-moves from wave 2 to wave 3). From wave 2 on the average fre-
quency of defection in no case drops below the 80 percent level – also in response to a coop-
erative move made by player B. On average, we once again observe that subjects behave 
rather selfish when playing the game a second and a third time. Our results are summarized in 
observation 1: 
Observation 1 (aggregate behavior) 
In two of the three classes of games (take games and PD games) we observe that in the first 
wave subjects, on average, do not show strictly selfish behavior. Over the two repetitions the 
fraction of purely self-interested decisions increases and in the last wave no more than 15 
percent of average behavior deviates from strict selfishness. In the give games we observe 
selfish behavior right from the beginning. 
 
                                                 
8 If not indicated otherwise, two-tailed exact McNemar tests are used. Differences are labeled as significant if     
p < 0.050 and are labeled as weakly significant if 0.050 ≤ p < 0.100. 
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5.2 Consistency of individual behavior 
5.2.1  Consistency within games 
In order to investigate whether subjects behave consistently within any one of the three 
classes of games, we use the three concepts of consistency introduced in section 3. Note that, 
as already mentioned, these concepts are no independent measures. Since selfishness (S-
consistency) is a special case of AM- and FS/CR-consistency, the additional explanatory 
power of the latter concepts is limited to the cases where behavior is non-selfish, but AM- or 
FS/CR-consistent. Furthermore, the AM-concept is by far the most general of the three. In 
particular, any FS/CR-consistent behavior in the take and give games is also AM-consistent, 
but this is not true vice versa. Only in the PD games, some FS/CR-consistent behavior is not 
AM-consistent (e.g., certain changes of behavior between PD I and PD II). On the other hand, 
there are strategies in the PD-games that are AM-consistent, but can never be FS/CR-
consistent (e.g., ’always cooperate’ or ’inverse tit-for-tat’). Therefore, we should expect that 
most of the decisions are AM-consistent and fewest are S-consistent. Figure 4 displays the 
results for all three waves: 
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Figure 4: Frequency of consistent behavior in all games in the three waves. 
For the take games, the concepts of AM- and FS/CR-consistency are identical and explain 
about 51 percent of all individual moves in the first wave, while 19 percent of subjects behave 
consistently selfish. That is, roughly a little more than 30 percent of the observed behavior in 
the first wave becomes consistent if we take into account that subjects may harbor preferences 
as used in the AM- and the FS/CR-concepts. In the second wave, we observe a highly signifi-
cant increase in consistent behavior. Now more than 80 percent of decisions are AM- and 
FS/CR-consistent and this frequency is still significantly higher than the 52 percent of S-
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consistent decisions. The observation that the difference between both frequencies remains 
the same implies that the increase in consistency is mainly due to more consistent selfishness. 
In the third wave, the share of selfish behavior again increases significantly to 86 percent. 
Only the decisions made by those 14 percent of subjects, who do not take all the money from 
players B, can be accounted for by AM and FS/CR-consistency only. Remarkably, we do not 
observe any individual move in wave 3, which can not be characterized as consistent in the 
sense of one of the three concepts.  
In the give games subjects behave selfish right from the start and do not significantly change 
their behavior over time. All three measures of consistency explain about 80 percent of ob-
served individual behavior; there are no significant differences within and between the three 
waves. Since those, who decide to give something to player B, choose only very small 
amounts, it seems to be adequate to characterize the overall behavior in the give games as 
“consistently selfish”. 
In the PD games we find different patterns of behavior. In the first wave all subjects behaved 
in an AM-consistent manner, while FS/CR-consistent behavior could be observed in only 20 
percent of all cases. The reason for the good performance of AM-consistency is the fact that 
all players A follow one of the four AM-consistent patterns: they always defect, or always 
cooperate, or always play tit-for-tat, or always play ‘inverted tit-for-tat’, i.e. play d/C and c/D. 
About 50 percent of the subjects behave strictly S-consistent and decide to always defect. The 
observation that not all of these subjects are FS/CR-consistent is due to the fact that they re-
veal β-values in the take games, which are not compatible with their d-moves in the PD-
games.9 The behavioral patterns observed in wave 1 are summarized in Table 7. 
 always d always c tit-for-tat inverted tit-for-tat 
PD I 55.0% (22/40) 15.0% (6/40) 17.5% (7/40) 12.5% (5/40) 
PD II 52.5% (21/40) 15.0% (6/40) 17.5% (7/40) 15.0% (6/40) 
PD 52.5% (21/40) 15.0% (6/40) 17.5% (7/40) 12.5% (5/40) 
Table 7: Behavior in the PD-games of wave 1. 
                                                 
9 In this respect, our notion of FS/CR-consistency in PD games already assumes some across-game consistency. 
If we focus on PD games only without further knowledge of the value of β, FS/CR preferences necessarily imply 
that players A following a D move will choose d, but have no implications regarding the response to a C move. 
Accordingly, FS/CR preferences are in line with ‘always d’ and ‘tit-for-tat’, respectively. 
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In waves 2 and 3, the share of S-consistency increases to 71.8 percent and 71.4 percent, re-
spectively. These shares are nearly identical to the share of AM-consistency. The reason is 
that AM-consistent strategies that are not S-consistent (tit-for-tat, inverted tit-for-tat, and al-
ways c) are hardly ever used any more. The increase of FS/CR-consistent behavior in waves 2 
and 3 can be attributed to the strong increase of selfish behavior in the take games in these 
waves. Subjects, who take away all the money from player B, exhibit low values of β and, 
consequently, their strategy to always defect is both, S-consistent and FS/CR-consistent. In 
particular, we find no single subject, whose behavior is AM-inconsistent and FS/CR-
consistent at the same time. Given this behavior, more than one fourth of all subjects make 
inconsistent decisions in the last two waves. We summarize in observation 2: 
Observation 2 (consistency within games): 
Consistency of behavior within the three classes of games increases during the course of the 
experiment. This increase is almost always due to the fact that, over time, more and more 
subjects make consistently selfish decisions. In the PD games we observe that, even in the last 
wave, about 25 percent of subjects display a behavior, which can not be characterized as con-
sistent by one of the three concepts under consideration. 
5.2.2  Consistency across games 
The strongest test for the consistency of individual behavior is the comparison of decisions 
made by a particular subject in different strategic situations. Figure 5 summarizes our findings 
regarding the consistency over all three classes of games. In all cases we employ the across-
game consistency measures introduced in section 3.4.  
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Figure 5: Consistency across games. 
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In the first wave, only about 10 percent of all subjects behave consistently selfish in all ten 
games. The same is true for FS/CR-consistency. AM-consistency, the most general concept of 
consistency, can account for the decisions made by 45 percent of subjects, and the differences 
to the other two measures are significant. The observations imply that more than 50 percent of 
all subjects behave inconsistently over the three classes of games. In wave 2, only the number 
of FS/CR-consistent subjects significantly increases. As a result, both concepts of consistency 
assuming non-selfish behavior perform equally well (no significant differences) and outper-
form S-consistency. In wave 3, overall inconsistency decreases to about 40 percent. More-
over, we observe a significant increase in the frequency of S-consistent behavior from wave 2 
to wave 3. Now nearly all of the FS/CR-consistent decisions and most of the AM-consistent 
decisions are a result of pure self-interest. The rather low proportion of S-consistent behavior 
observed in the first two waves is due to the fact that subjects tend to make ‘exceptions’ from 
their otherwise selfish behavior while, in the third wave, they consistently stick to their self-
ishness in all ten games. We summarize in observation 3: 
Observation 3 (consistency across games): 
Compared to the proportion of within-game consistency the proportion of consistent behavior 
across games is rather low. While in the first two waves selfishness is rarely observed across 
games, it clearly dominates behavior in the third wave. In this wave about 60 percent of all 
decisions can be characterized as consistent across games. 
5.3 Stability of individual behavior 
Our concept of stability is rather simple. We denote individual behavior as stable, if the sub-
ject always makes the same decision in the same game. As the question of stability is one of 
our major concerns, the results are presented in more detail by looking at the stability of indi-
vidual behavior over waves 1 and 2, over waves 2 and 3, and over all three waves, separately. 
Figure 6 illustrates the stability of behavior observed in all games over the first two waves. 
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Figure 6: Frequency of stable behavior in the three game types – from wave 1 to wave 2. 
In the four take games, there are 9 subjects (23 percent), who do not change their behavior 
over the first two waves. Out of these 9 subjects, the behavior of 7 subjects is in line with S-
consistency, and the behavior of all 9 subjects is in line with both, AM- and FS/CR-
consistency. In the four give games we observe 28 subjects (72 percent), who behave in a 
stable manner over waves 1 and 2. The behavior of all 28 subjects is in line with S-
consistency. In the two PD games there are 19 subjects (49 percent), who do not change their 
behavior over the first two waves. The behavior of all 19 subjects (who always choose d) is in 
line with S-consistency, AM-, and FS/CR-consistency. 
These results imply that particularly those subjects, who behave (consistently) selfish, make 
stable decisions over time. Consequently, we observe a high frequency of stable behavior in 
those classes of games, which reveal a high number of S-consistent decisions, i.e., the fre-
quency of individual stability is significantly higher in give games than in PD games and in 
take games and weakly significantly higher in PD games than in take games. 
This supposition is further supported when investigating the stability of individual behavior 
over waves 2 and 3, and over all three waves. In the four take games, the significant increase 
of S-consistent behavior over time is accompanied by a significant increase of stable behavior 
from the first two waves to the last two waves. In particular, in wave 3 we observe 18 subjects 
(51 percent), who make the same decisions as in wave 2. All of the 18 subjects’ decisions are 
S-consistent. Calculating the total number of subjects, who behave stable in the take games 
over all three waves, we find that all of these 7 subjects behave in line with S-consistency. 
Figures 7-9 summarize the relative frequencies of stable behavior observed in wave 3 (com-
pared to wave 2) and over all waves. 
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Figure 7:  Frequency of stable behavior in the take games – wave 2 to 3 and over all waves. 
In the give games, we do not find a significant change regarding S-consistent behavior over 
time and also do not find a significant difference between waves 2 and 3 regarding the num-
ber of subjects displaying a stable behavior. There are 29 subjects (83 percent), who make the 
same decisions over the last two waves, and again all of these subjects’ decisions are S-
consistent. Over all three waves the frequency of stable behavior in give games (which is also 
S-consistent) is 66 percent. 
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Figure 8: Frequency of stable behavior in the give games – wave 2 to 3 and over all waves. 
In the PD games there is a significant increase of S-consistent behavior from wave 1 to wave 
2. Accordingly, the frequency of stable behavior in these games significantly increases from 
the first two waves to the last two waves. In wave 3 we observe 25 subjects (71 percent), who 
do not change their behavior compared to wave 2. 23 of the 25 subjects can be classified as S-
consistent. In total, 43 percent of subjects do not change their behavior over all three waves in 
 21
the PD games. All of them make decisions, which are in line with S-consistency but are not 
consistent with any of the other concepts. 
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Figure 9:  Frequency of stable behavior in the PD games – wave 2 to 3 and over all waves. 
While over the first two waves, PD games and give games significantly differ regarding the 
frequency of stable behavior, we find no such difference over waves 2 and 3. Both classes of 
games still significantly differ regarding this frequency from the take games, however. Com-
paring the three classes of games regarding the frequency of stable behavior observed over all 
three waves reveals a (weakly) significantly higher stability in give games than in PD games 
and in take games and a significantly higher stability in PD games than in take games. Our 
findings are summarized in observation 4: 
Observation 4 (stability): 
Over all three waves, the frequency of stable behavior in the take games is rather low (less 
than 20 percent), in the PD games it is about 40 percent, and in the give games it is more than 
60 percent. All subjects, who behave stable over waves 1, 2, and 3, make strictly selfish deci-
sions. Also between two adjacent waves we find only a few subjects displaying stable but not 
selfish behavior. The increase of stability observed from wave 2 to wave 3 is largely due to an 
increase of S-consistent behavior.  
6 Discussion and conclusion 
During the last decade a lot of experimental evidence in favor of the existence of some kind of 
other-regarding preferences has been produced. In the first wave of our three-wave-design, we 
add some more findings to this evidence, as most of the observed behavior cannot be ex-
plained by the assumption that subjects behave like rational egoistic payoff maximizers. Par-
ticularly the observations made on aggregate and on individual behavior in wave 1 leave room 
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for explanations along the lines of theories assuming some kind of other-regarding prefer-
ences. For example some of the results on our give games and on our take games in the first 
wave seem to confirm the assumptions made by Fehr and Schmidt, namely that subjects are 
rather willing to accept inequality when they are better off than their opponents, than in the 
case in which they are behind. The theory by Fehr and Schmidt accounts for a rather low 
share of decisions, however, when investigating individual consistency across games. Our 
observations are, thus, similar to those reported by Blanko, Engelmann, and Normann (2006), 
who test Fehr and Schmidt’s theory with regard to individual consistency across four games. 
In particular, Blanco et al. also find that the theory by Fehr and Schmidt is capable of explain-
ing only a very small fraction of individual behavior, while the aggregate data is generally 
compatible with this theory. 
The major result of our investigations is that, over the three repetitions of our experiment, 
subjects change their behavior tremendously. These changes have one unique direction, which 
is common to all subjects: They behave more and more purely self-interested. In particular, 
stable behavior over time is observed only for those subjects, who make strictly selfish deci-
sions. 
Given these findings, several more or less fundamental questions inevitably arise. The first 
line of questions seems to be quite obvious: Why is the observed behavior that instable and 
why do subjects, who start with other than self-interested behavior, turn out to be homines 
oeconomici in the end? Two plausible (though speculative) explanations are at hand. First, it 
might be that subjects learn to be selfish in the sense that they find out that it does not hurt not 
to care for others. Therefore, in the third wave, they know that there is no internal punishment 
mechanism (bad feelings, bad conscience) at work when they take all the money, give noth-
ing, and defect in the PD games. The second possible explanation is that subjects feel obliged 
to care for others, but that this obligation is finally fulfilled by forgoing to behave strictly self-
ishly just once (independent of the fact that they are matched with new opponents in each of 
the three waves). Consequently, subjects in later waves might have the impression that they 
have done their duty and are in a position in which it is justified to care only about the own 
payoff. 
The second line of questions concerns a more general, methodological point. Given our re-
sults, the question is what is the relevant experimental evidence? Do we learn from our ex-
periment that people behave selfishly or that they are not selfish in general? The answer to 
this questions depends on the specific wave we look at and this leads to the general question 
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of what “true” experimental evidence is. Is it the behavior we observe when we invite subjects 
to the laboratory for the first time (which is the case in most of the experimental studies), or 
do we have to give subjects the chance to become familiar with the experimental situation? 
What is of greater importance, the behavior of the ‘inexperienced’ subjects in the first wave or 
the behavior by ‘mature’ subjects in the final wave? These methodological questions seem to 
be of fundamental relevance for experimental research. 
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Appendix A: Equivalence of F/S and C/R Preferences 
 
For a two-person-game with players A and B, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) specify individual A’s 
preferences concerning his own payoff πA and his opponent’s payoff πB: 
( ) ( )( )  for      
for      
,
A
A
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The respective specification by Charness and Rabin (2002, p.822) reads 
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where q is an indicator variable signaling the presence of reciprocity. As we designed our 
experiments in a way that avoids reciprocity, we can, for our paper, set 0:=q , which leads to 
the simple specification 
( )  
for      )1(
for      )1(
,
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This can be re-written as  
( ) ( )( )  for      
for      
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This form shows that, for the purpose of our paper, the specification by Fehr and Schmidt and 
the one by Charness and Rabin are equivalent for βρ =  and ασ −= . 
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Appendix B: Figures 
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Figure B1: Total amount allocated by players A to themselves (black lines indicate the 
maximum and minimum amounts). 
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Figure B2: Total amount allocated by players A to player B (black lines indicate the 
maximum and minimum amounts). 
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Appendix C: Data 
 
Table C.1: Individual τ in Take Games 
 
wave 1 2 3 
game T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4 
subject             
1 350 450 350 450 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
2 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
3 500 500 50 0 200 0 500 0 500 500 500 500 
4 0 0 0 0 500 500 400 500         
5 0 0 0 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
6 0 400 50 0 500 500 500 0 500 500 500 500 
7 0 0 50 0 0 500 0 0 500 500 500 500 
8 450 400 350 200 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
9 0 200 50 500 500 500 500 0 500 500 500 500 
10 200 250 200 200                 
11 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
12 450 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
13 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 0         
14 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 500 500 450 450 
15 100 150 100 50 400 400 400 400 500 500 500 500 
16 100 50 100 150 200 500 200 500 500 500 500 500 
17 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
18 0 200 0 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
19 500 500 450 450 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 500 500 500 
21 250 200 400 500 500 500 450 450 500 500 500 500 
22 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
23 500 450 500 500 500 500 250 300 500 500 500 500 
24 500 450 400 350 500 500 500 400 500 500 500 500 
25 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
26 0 0 0 0 500 500 450 400 500 500 500 500 
27 500 500 250 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
28 500 500 200 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
29 500 300 300 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
30 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
31 200 250 0 0 300 250 150 0 350 350 300 200 
32 500 500 500 0 500 500 500 400 500 500 500 500 
33 0 100 50 50 0 150 100 50 500 500 500 500 
34 0 0 0 0 500 500 450 200 500 500 500 500 
35 200 300 300 0 450 450 400 350 500 450 450 400 
36 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
37 500 500 400 450 500 500 500 350 500 500 500 400 
38 500 500 500 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
39 400 400 200 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
40 500 300 400 0 500 500 500 500 500 500 450 450 
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Table C.2: Individual γ in Give Games 
 
wave 1 2 3 
game G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4 G1 G2 G3 G4 
subject  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 50 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0         
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0                 
11 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 500 0 0 500 0 0 0 0         
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 450 0 
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23 0 0 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0         
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
31 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 0         
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
33 50 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 0 0 0 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 50 0 100 0 0 0 0 50 100 0 0 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 
38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 50 0 0 
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Table C.3: Individual Action Choices in PD games 
 
wave 1 2 3 
Game PD I PD II PD I PD II PD I PD II 
 if C if D if C if D if C if D if C if D if C if D if C if D 
subject  
1 d d d d d d d d d d c c 
2 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
3 c d c d d d c c d c c c 
4 d c d c d d d d         
5 c c c c d d d d d d d d 
6 c c c c c c c d c d c c 
7 c d c d d d d d d d d d 
8 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
9 d c d c d c d d d d d c 
10 d d d c                 
11 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
12 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
13 d d d d d d d d         
14 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
15 c d c d c c c d d d d c 
16 d c d c d d d d d d d d 
17 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
18 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
19 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
20 c c c c c d d d d d d d 
21 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
22 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
23 d d d d d d d d c c c d 
24 d c d c d d d d d d d d 
25 d c d c d c d d d c d d 
26 c d c d d d d d d d d d 
27 c d c d d d d d d d d d 
28 d d d d c c c d d d d d 
29 d d d d d d d d d d     
30 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
31 d d d d c c d c c c     
32 c c c c c c c d c d c d 
33 c d c d d d d d d d d d 
34 c d c d c d d d c d d d 
35 c c c c c d d d d c d c 
36 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
37 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
38 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
39 d d d d d d d d d d d d 
40 c c c c d d d d d d d d 
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Appendix D: Instructions (for players A; similar instructions were handed out to players B) 
 
Note 
You are participating in an investigation of individual decision behavior. If you have any 
questions, which are not answered by these instructions, please let us know. We will come to 
you and answer your questions. 
During this experiment you will earn money. It depends on your decisions during the experi-
ment how much money this will be. At the end of the experiment the money will be paid to 
you in the office of the chair “VWL III” (room C-214) if you display your ID card there. 
 
Decision 
During the experiment, you will have to make decisions at the computer. Before every deci-
sion, you will be given detailed instructions on the computer screen. 
There is one other participant involved in each of your decision situations. This other partici-
pant will be will newly allocated to you in each of your decision situations. We made sure that 
you will interact with one and the same participant only once. No participant learns the iden-
tity of his allocated partners neither during nor after the experiment. Your decisions remain 
anonymous. 
Please keep in mind that your decision situations are independent of one another, which 
means that none of your decisions has an influence on the other decisions. 
 
[Wave 3 only: 
In the appendix, you will find a list of the decision situations you will be confronted with dur-
ing this experiment.] 
 
Payoff 
At the end of the experiment we will compute your payoff in the laboratory. The exchange 
rate of laboratory cents to EURO cents is 150 laboratory Cents = 100 EURO cent. The payoff 
to each of the participants will be put into an envelope, the envelope will be closed and la-
beled with the respective ID number. The enveloped will then be brought to the office of the 
chair “VLW III”, where a member of the staff, who was not involved into the computation of 
the payoffs and who is sitting behind a blind, will hand out your payoff if you display your ID 
card. This procedure makes sure that your decisions remain anonymous vis-a-vis the other 
participants and vis-a-vis the experimenter. 
 
Please do not communicate with the other participant during the experiment. Moreover, we 
would like to ask you not to talk about the experiment to others in order to avoid influencing 
the behavior of potential future participants. 
 
We thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix [Wave 3, session 2 only] 
 
 
decision situation 1: 
Here you can determine the payoff to yourself and the payoff to your partner. Please choose 
one of the following combinations of payoffs: 
choice: { You: 500  Partner: 500 
 { You: 450  Partner: 550 
 { You: 400  Partner: 600 
 { You: 350  Partner: 650 
 { You: 300  Partner: 700 
 { You: 250  Partner: 750 
 { You: 200  Partner: 800 
 { You: 150  Partner: 850 
 { You: 100  Partner: 900 
 { You: 50  Partner: 950 
 { You: 0  Partner: 1000 
 
 
decision situation 2: 
Here you can determine the payoff to yourself and the payoff to your partner. Please choose 
one of the following combinations of payoffs: 
choice: { You: 500  Partner: 500 
 { You: 450  Partner: 600 
 { You: 400  Partner: 700 
 { You: 350  Partner: 800 
 { You: 300  Partner: 900 
 { You: 250  Partner: 1000 
 { You: 200  Partner: 1100 
 { You: 150  Partner: 1200 
 { You: 100  Partner: 1300 
 { You: 50  Partner: 1400 
 { You: 0  Partner: 1500 
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decision situation 3: 
Please choose one of the “strategies” A or B for every possible choice of your partner. Your 
payoff depends on what you choose and what your partner chooses. 
The following table displays your payoffs. If your partner chooses “A” and you choose “A if 
partner chooses A”, your payoff is 500 (Your payoff is given by the second entry of the re-
spective cell in the table given below.) If your partner chooses “A” and you choose “B if part-
ner chooses A”, your payoff is 900, the one of your partner is 100. If your partner chooses 
“B” and your chose “”A if partner chooses B”, your payoff is 100, the payoff of your partner 
is 900. In the case that your partner chooses “B” and you choose “B if partner chooses B”, 
your payoff is 200 and the payoff of your partner is also 200. 
 you choose A you choose B 
Your partner chooses A 500  ,  500 100  ,  900 
Your partner chooses B 900  ,  100 200  ,  200 
 
 
Your choice, if partner chooses “A”  { A 
         { B 
 
Your choice, if partner chooses “B”  { A 
         { B 
 
decision situation 4: 
Here you can determine the payoff to yourself and the payoff to your partner. Please choose 
one of the following combinations of payoffs: 
choice: { You: 500  Partner: 500 
 { You: 450  Partner: 525 
 { You: 400  Partner: 550 
 { You: 350  Partner: 575 
 { You: 300  Partner: 600 
 { You: 250  Partner: 625 
 { You: 200  Partner: 650 
 { You: 150  Partner: 675 
 { You: 100  Partner: 700 
 { You: 50  Partner: 725 
 { You: 0  Partner: 750 
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decision situation 5: 
Here you can determine the payoff to yourself and the payoff to your partner. Please choose 
one of the following combinations of payoffs: 
choice: { You: 500  Partner: 500 
 { You: 450  Partner: 575 
 { You: 400  Partner: 850 
 { You: 350  Partner: 925 
 { You: 300  Partner: 1000 
 { You: 250  Partner: 1025 
 { You: 200  Partner: 1050 
 { You: 150  Partner: 1125 
 { You: 100  Partner: 1200 
 { You: 50  Partner: 1225 
 { You: 0  Partner: 1250 
 
